Sectoral Agreements Carbon Leakage

98% of industrial emissions covered by the 2015-2020 CO2 emissions list. A recent study by the Danish Environment Council attempts to calculate the size of leakage effects by sector for the Danish economy, taking into account the specific organisation of EU climate policy. The Commission`s competent services have placed great importance on stakeholder consultation, while drawing up the first list of carbon leakage sectors, which was adopted at the end of 2009. In 2009, several meetings were held with representatives of industry, NGOs, scientists and Member States, with a view to establishing the list. The meeting documents and reports are available on the DG Climate Action website. In May 2018, the preliminary list of CO2 leaks was published and the results of the first level assessment were presented. These include the assessment of the sectors of NACE 4 that are directly eligible for the list, since their respective carbon leakage indicators (the sector`s trade intensity multiplied by its emission intensity) were above the 0.2 threshold. In addition, the provisional list of co2 leaks identified sectors and sub-sectors eligible for the second level assessment. allocation of allowances free of charge on the basis of benchmarks.

This is the approach used in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme to prevent CARBONE leaks to the processing industry. While the quotas that producing companies must purchase in order to emit greenhouse gases are normally auctioned, industries benefit from free quotas within the meaning of greenhouse gases. In order to ensure the competitiveness of ETS industries, production in sectors and sub-sectors at significant risk of carbon leakage is higher than other industrial facilities. Dear guest, thank you for this very informative and contemporary contribution. I agree that carbon leakage is often used as an argument to avoid a reduction in emissions in one`s own sector. But I wonder if the problem of carbon leakage is overestimated. Carbon leakage is only relevant in two cases: (1) emissions leaks to a country outside the Paris Agreement, (2) emissions leaks to a sector outside the Paris Agreement (for example. B international air transport). In all other cases, I think carbon leakage is irrelevant because countries have to live up to their commitments.

If one country increases its exports due to CO2 leakage in another country, the former country only has to get additional emission reductions elsewhere. A more lenient approach to agriculture, however, can be supported for another reason: many reduction options are not fully reflected in national stock calculation methods. Even if emissions were reduced in the “real world,” they would not help countries meet their commitments. Reduction options may also be more expensive in agriculture than in other non-SCE sectors. At least that is the case in Norway. The application of a carbon tax to non-ETS sectors should be sufficient to achieve a country-to-country distribution of emissions reductions across sectors, which minimizes social costs. Efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in one country will generally lead to an increase in emissions in other countries – a phenomenon called KOHLEnstofFleckage (for simplicity, I will use the term carbon leakage, although the same result applies to other greenhouse gases).

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