The areas chosen for the referendum are not quite the same as in Godesberg`s ultimatum. For example, the industrial city and the railway node of Brno are not included. But the Germans will be so close to this city that it will be at their mercy. In addition, it has a small German minority (about 12 per cent of the total population) who, under Hitler`s pressure, will be its true administrators. Each village or commune with a German majority (and there are many scattered in Czechoslovakia and up to the Ruthenia of the Carpathians) in regions where the Czechs are very majority, can be transformed by the instrument of the referendum into a German fortress that dominates the surrounding land like the castle of a barrel of medieval brigands. With the help of the referendum, Hitler could take control of factories, railways and strategic points. In a short time, without war and without serious resistance from Western forces, he could become the master of Czechoslovakia. After Poland learned that populated territories in Poland were to be transferred to Germany, Poland issued a note to the Czechoslovak government regarding the immediate conclusion of an agreement providing for the unquestionable occupation of Polish territory by Polish troops; An agreement on referendums is expected to follow in districts with a large proportion of the Polish population.  “Czechoslovakia has decided to accept all Munich conditions on 30 September. On the morning of 30 September, Benes addressed the Soviet ambassador desperately.
“Czechoslovakia is faced with the choice to start the war with Germany and has Britain and France against it,… or capitulate to the aggressor. What would be the attitude of the U.S.S.R. towards these two possibilities, “that is, a continuation of the struggle or the capitulation”? Before the Soviet government could discuss the issue, another telegram told them that no answer was needed: “The Czechoslovakian government has already decided to accept all the conditions.” It is hard to believe that the investigation was conducted seriously. Benea remained true to his determination that Czechoslovakia could not fight alone or with Soviet Russia as a single ally. Years later, in 1944, he claimed that the Polish threat to Ticino had given him the last push for surrender; if so, it was just a boost in the direction in which he had decided to go.